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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to investigate the influence of family ownership on the
financial performance of firms listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange from 2008 to
2012. The methodology used is multiple linear regression. The financial performance
is measured with return on assets (ROA). The research shows that family ownership
does not significantly influence firm performance. This paper is particularly important
to the policymakers and shareholders of firms in Indonesia and other developing
economies since it provides a comprehensive insight into the family ownership – firm
performance relationship and therefore it helps them to formulate the best policies.
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1. Introduction
Publicly traded firms across the globe commonly are controlled by family shareholders
[5]. Anderson and Reeb (2003a) found that one third of Standard and Poor (S&P)
500 firms are owned by families and family ownership accounts for 18 percent of
outstanding equity. Such controlling families often hold large equity stakes and are
represented in the corporate board [10]. Turnover and recruitment costs in family firms
are lowered because trust and loyalty are fostered by the working environment [14].
Due to its dominance in the global economy, the authors are interested to undertake
a research on family ownership. There are ample literatures that have discussed the
effect or influence of family ownership on firm performance. While those literatures
mainly deal with the context of developed economies, this paper examines the rela-
tionship between family ownership and financial performance of listed companies in
Indonesia, one of developing economies in Asia.
The organization of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the liter-
ature review on directors’ ownership. Section 3 describes the research methodology.
Section 4 presents the summary of the findings, and Section 5 concludes.
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Anderson et al. (2003) posit that founding families “represent a special class of large
shareholders that potentially have unique incentive structures, a strong voice in the
firm, and powerful motives to manage one particular firm.” In addition, Anderson et al.
also argued that two respects distinguish founding families with other shareholders:
the family’s interest in the firm’s long-term survival and its concern for the firm’s
(family’s) reputation.
Anderson and Reeb (2003b) posited that founding families have strong incentives
to minimise firm risk due to the undiversified nature of their holdings and their desire
for firm survival. Firm risk can be reduced by founding families in two ways. First,
firm’s investment decisions may be influenced by families through pursuing projects
with imperfectly correlated cash flows relative to existing projects (corporate diversi-
fication). Second, capital forms that bear low probabilities of default may be chosen
by families (more use of equity financing or less use of leverage in the firm’s capital
structure). However, these strategies can impose costs on diversified and minority
shareholders.
Family ownership also has potential drawbacks. Fama and Jensen (1985) claimed
that since the interests of the family are not necessarily in line with those of other
shareholders, the combination of management and control in the hand of family might
lead to sub-optimal investment decisions. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) argued that fam-
ilies may pursue nonpecuniary private benefits of control. According to Shleifer and
Vishny (1997), the family executives might remain active in the firm although they are
no longer competent (entrenchment effect).
Andres (2008) found that familiesmight be different with other types of large share-
holders when they serve as board members. Through serving as board members,
families possibly have a deeper relationship with the firm they own-manage or might
even feel responsible for other shareholders.
Furthermore, it is possible that family shareholders own shares of a firm indirectly.
Indirect ownership means a shareholder hold the shares through entities that he or she
controls [9]. Sacristan-Navarro and Gomez-Anson (2007) argued that indirect owner-
ship occurs when the significant shareholders hold the shares through an intermediate
firm. Thus, family shareholders are considered to have an indirect ownership stake
at a firm if they hold shares of another firm who is a corporate shareholder of the
aforementioned firm.
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3. Research Methodology
3.1. Data, variable and sample characteristics
The data population is 140 industrial and manufacturing companies listed on the
Indonesia Stock Exchange. The population comes from an independent website about
listed firms on the Indonesia Stock Exchange. Of the population, 43 companies meet
the sampling criteria.
The sampling criteria are as follows:
1. Listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange on or prior to 2 January 2008 and remain
listed until 31 December 2012.
2. Have complete information required in this research.
3. Financial year end at 31 December from 2008 to 2012.
The sample size is considerably small if compared to the population. The smallness
of the sample size is largely a result of the incompleteness of information required from
the firms. Hence, firms with incomplete required information have to be removed from
the samples.
In this paper, firm performance is measured with return on assets (ROA). Family
ownership is measured with the total percentage of common stock owned by fam-
ily/families. Firm size (measured with total assets) and sales growth serve as control
variables.
The research method used in this paper involves the collation of data of 43 man-
ufacturing companies available from online financial databases (secondary data), i.e.
Thomson One and Orbis.
3.2. Regression model
To investigate the influence of family ownership on firm performance in Indonesia, the
following multiple linear regression model is used:
ROA = ß0 + ß1FO + ß2TA+ ß3SG + u
where:
ROA = return on assets
FO = family ownership
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TA = total assets
SG = sales growth
4. Empirical Results and Data Analysis
4.1. Return on assets
The sampled firms listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange have an average ROA of
6.61% during the period of 2008 to 2012. The average ROA reached the lowest level
in 2008 (3.64%) and it reached its highest level in 2011 (7.58%).
4.2. Family ownership
Below is the table of regression result of the relationship between family ownership
and return on assets:
T 1: Regression result of the relationship between family ownership and ROA in Indonesia.
Coefficients𝑎
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized
Coefficients
T Sig.
B Std. Error Beta
1 (Constant) 5,011 ,846 5,920 ,000
Family
Ownership
,003 ,061 ,003 ,051 ,959
Total Assets ,004 ,003 ,083 1,216 ,226
Sales Growth ,079 ,022 ,235 3,502 ,001
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets
On Table 1, we can see that the p value of family ownership (0.959) is greater than α
value (0.05). Therefore, family ownership does not significantly influence ROA of firms
in Indonesia. Table 1 in Appendix shows that the value of R square is 0.068; meaning
that 6.8% of the variation of ROA can be explained by independent variables in the
model and 93.2% of it is explained by other variables not included in the model.
Table 1 also shows that sales growth significantly and positively influences ROA (p
value = 0.001). To further investigate such influence, the samples of firms are divided
according to their sales growth and then the regression using samples of growing
and non-growing firms is conducted. Firms with sales growth above average fall into
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growing firms category, and those with sales growth below average fall into non-
growing firms category. The average sales growth of firms in Indonesia in this research
is 12.65%. Below are the tables of the regression analysis for both firm groups.
T 2: Regression result of the relationship between family ownership and ROA of growing firms in
Indonesia (101 observations).
Coefficients𝑎
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized
Coefficients
T Sig.
B Std. Error Beta
1 (Constant) 8,653 1,505 5,751 ,000
Family
Ownership
,010 ,069 ,015 ,151 ,880
Total Assets ,007 ,003 ,200 2,001 ,048
Sales Growth -,040 ,035 -,113 -1,138 ,258
a. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets
T 3: Regression result of the relationship between family ownership and ROA in non-growing firms in
Indonesia (114 observations).
Coefficients𝑎
Model Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized
Coefficients
T Sig.
B Std. Error Beta
1 (Constant) 6,472 1,280 5,057 ,000
Family
Ownership
,000 ,095 ,000 ,004 ,996
Total Assets -,001 ,005 -,014 -,149 ,882
Sales Growth ,250 ,060 ,368 4,131 ,000
Dependent Variable: Return On Assets
It appears on Table 2 and Table 3 that family ownership does not significantly influ-
ence ROA of both growing and non-growing firms in Indonesia (family ownership
p value of growing firms = 0.88; family ownership p value of non-growing firms =
0.996). In addition, sales growth only significantly and positively influences ROA of
non-growing firms (p value = 0).
The results above show that the ROA of firms in Indonesia is not significantly influ-
enced by family ownership. This finding contradicts the literature mentioned in this
paper which shows positive or negative relationship between family ownership and
ROA.
DOI 10.18502/kss.v3i10.3161 Page 658
ICE-BEES 2018
4.3. Multicollinearity and autocorrelation test
In order to check whether the regression models are free from multicollinearity
and autocorrelation, collinearity statistics and Durbin-Watson values are used. Mul-
ticollinearity does not occur when tolerance value is equal to or above 0.1 (Field, 2013)
and variance inflation factor (VIF) is below 5 or 10 [11]. On the other hand, positive
autocorrelation occurs when d is less than d𝑙 (lower bound) and negative autocorrela-
tion occurs when (4 – d) is less than d𝑢. The multicollinearity and autocorrelation and
tests show that the regression models are free from these statistical problems. More
details on these tests can be seen in the Appendix.
5. Summary & Conclusions
This paper addresses the question whether family ownership influences firm perfor-
mance in Indonesia. The results presented in this paper conclude that family ownership
does not significantly influence firm performance in Indonesia. The finding of this paper
shows that the argument put forward by Anderson and Reeb (2003a) which stated that
founding families have strong incentives to minimise firm risk due to the undiversified
nature of their holdings and their desire for firm survival does not apply in Indonesian
context. In addition, the claim that the combination of management and control in the
hand of familymight lead to sub-optimal investment decisions [7] cannot be confirmed
in this paper. The findings of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Andres (2008) are also not
supported.
The insignificant relationship between family ownership and firm performance
found in this paper might be evidence that the existence of family ownership should
not be taken into account as the consideration of investment decision. Therefore,
shareholders are recommended to putmore focus on other factors thatmight influence
firm performance.
This paper has some limitations that need to be addressed by future researchers:
1. The samples are only collected from manufacturing industry. Future researchers
are advised to incorporate samples from all industries to facilitate better andmore
comprehensive investigation of directors’ ownership-firm performance relation-
ship.
2. The relatively small sample size might weaken the validity and reliability of the
research in this paper. Future researchers are advised to increase the sample
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size that can be achieved through incorporation of samples from other industries
and/or primary data collection on the firms.
3. The non-existence of family ownership on a firm cannot be 100% guaranteed
because it is possible that the firm is owned indirectly by family/families through
pyramidal ownership. Future researchers are recommended to also take into
account the existence of pyramidal ownership to identify family ownership.
Appendix
T 4: R-Square and Durbin-Watson values of regression model of all firms.
Model Summary𝑏






1 ,260𝑎 ,068 ,054 8,67824 2,154
a. Predictors: (Constant), Sales Growth, Family Ownership, Total Assets
b. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets
T 5: R-Square and Durbin-Watson values of regression model of growing firms.
Model Summary𝑏






1 ,222𝑎 ,049 ,020 7,14870 2,099
a. Predictors: (Constant), Sales Growth, Family Ownership, Total Assets
b. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets
T 6: R-Square and Durbin-Watson values of regression model of non-growing firms.
Model Summary𝑏






1 ,367𝑎 ,135 ,111 9,33142 2,221
a. Predictors: (Constant), Sales Growth, Family Ownership, Total Assets
b. Dependent Variable: Return On Assets
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